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There are few subjects upon which it is more difl&cult to please
all readers than that of Human Rights. While nearly everyone be
lieves that there are certain rights which are "fundamental" there is
little agreement upon precisely what basis these precious rights are
fundamental. In general, there are three major approaches to the
subject. The first is that human rights represent the merely experi
mental or positive experience of evolving man. The second seeks to
ground human rights almost wholly in what is called 'Natural Law'
and thus see man's rights as inalienable to man simply because he
is man. The third, while recognizing the basic validity of Natural
Law, feel that human rights proceed more directly from the God of
Grace, so that an explicit recognition of the divine sovereignty in
human life is a sine qua non of a society which gives due place to
the dignity and rights of man.
It may be said, in brief, that the first of these is naturalistic,
the second metaphysical and formalistic, the third theological. The
subject in hand divides itself rather easUy into two parts : first, upon
what basis do human rights rest?; and second, what rights may be
considered proper and inalienable to man?
I.
The naturalistic or positivistic approach to the subject is the
child of the evolutionary philosophy, and which makes morality to
inhere in the folk-ways of the human community. Legal codes be
come little or nothing more than the codified mores of the social
group. The moral becomes the legal. Human rights are, to this
view, discoverable by rummaging through parchments and the Ht-
erature of the past. Trial-and-error becomes the source of both that
which is legal and that which is right. One jurist expresses this posi
tion in the following words:
And so, if I am to say what are "the principles of civil liberties and
human rights," I will answer that they lie in habits, customs�conventions
if you will�that tolerate dissent and can live without irrefragible cer
tainties . . .1
1 Judge Learned Hand, "A Fanfare for Prometheus" in Vital Speeches,
March 1, 1955, p. 1074.
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This doctrme is open to grave objections. If the rights of man
are merely positive (i.e., resting upon use or custom), then any
course of conduct may be made right by statute. This is precisely
what the dictators have assumed as a basis for their conduct. The
problem arises at once, however, whether a simple appeal to usage
may not show that the most perverse and the most brutal type of
practice have been found to be acceptable in some society.
It is small wonder that a Justice of our Supreme Court has
wryly remarked that the contemporary interpretation of civil rights
in our day has been made difficult by the body of positive decisions
of the past century, made under the impact of a century in which
evolutionism and naturalism have been largely dominant in our
national life. Small wonder that jurisprudence is today seeking a
new insight into "first principles" of morafity. Further, the hammer-
blows of Fascist and Communist tyranny have compelled an 'ex
perimental' West to give sober pause. At Niirnberg, western man
was brought face to face with the real consequences of a naturalistic
and a moral jurisprudence. And in spite of the cynicism with which
the work of Justice Jackson and his associates has been viewed, the
Niirnberg Trials did seek to restore a moral foundation to western
Law.
Communist dogma, with its assumption of a materialistic
dynamism behind all of life, and its twin assumption of the com
plete malleability of human nature, has from the first assumed that
law and right are of positive origin, and that morality and conveni
ence are one. Its omnipotent State becomes the highest and final
source of human rights. The will and fiat of that State may shape,
alter, revoke or revise the right of any man at any time. This is the
reductio ad absurdum of a philosophy of man completely divorced
from his origin in a divine creation.
The second approach to the source of human rights is that
which sees them as grounded in Natural Law. At the outset, some
will dismiss this with the wave of the hand, suggesting that Natural
Law is a vaporous concept, an abstraction understood only by the
detached jurist or the theologian who lives in an ivory tower, out of
touch with the realities of life. There is no doubt some justification
for this objection, for it seems to the outsider that the Roman
Pontiff, when he has no better argument to support his case for
some course of action, often turns his argument upon some appeal
to his interpretation of Natural Law. However, to toss out the baby
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with the bath would be folly; and certainly God created man before
the State, or before legal codes existed. Out of the relationship set
up in Creation, human rights did appear.
In seeking to discover in what sense certain human rights are
'fundamental,' scholars and jurists are endeavoring to break out of
the positivistic routine, and to ground morality and right beyond
the reach of mere convention or utility. The most conspicuous ex
ample of this type of thinking conceming human rights is that of
the framers of the American Declaration of Independence. One is
amazed at the coolness and restraint of such men as Thomas Jeffer
son. Writing in the midst of fundamental abuses and grievances,
and with war a certainty, he and his colleagues could write: "We
hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap
piness."
George Sokolsky rightly observes:
It must seem curious that the revolutionists of 1776 wrote such a dec
laration at all. Why did they go to all the trouble of basing their claims for
independence upon a philosophy of life? Why did they not shriek:
"Down with the king!"
"Hang King George III!"
"No taxation without representation."
"Murder the tax collectors!"
"All power to the workers and peasants!"
"Kill the priests!"
Similar slogans have been the battle cries of revolutions from Spartacus
to Lenin.2
What a contrast between such an hypothetical pronouncement
and the calm with which the Declaration of Independence was
framed. It may be said that this was the fundamental difference be
tween the American Revolution and that of France, or of most of
the European revolutions since that time. It is as different as
day is different from night, from the wording of the Communist
Manifesto:
The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class
struggles.
Freeman and slave, patricial and plebian, lord and serf, guild-master
2 Barrett, Edward F. (Ed.) Natural Law Institute Proceedings, Volume
IV, 1950.
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and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant oppo
sition to one another, carried on an . . . open fight . . .
Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communist revolution. The prole
tarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.
The contrasts between the two ways of doing things are both
numerous and obvious. Note, first, the reverent tone of the Declara
tion of Independence. Basic is the recognition of the Creator-
created relationship. Some may and do object, that the framers,
especially Franklin and Jefferson, were deists, and that the Declara
tion really suggests that God set the world of humans in motion,
and left them to work out their own ways. While there may be some
plausibility to this argument, it is not necessarily the final word on
the subject. In other words, it is possible that deism and theism
overlap at this point, and that a deist may lay hold upon some prin
ciples central and significant for a theistic interpretation of things.
The pronouncements of the founders of our nation thus reflect
the after-glow of Puritanism, with its insistence upon the divine
sovereignty and its firm convictions upon the subject of the origin
and destiny of human life. The rigors of 150 years on the new con
tinent had kept the colonists from falling under bondage to things
and to material comfort. They retamed, in the midst of a regret
table loss of much of the content of a great theology, a reliance
upon divine guidance. Their eyes were stifl upon the laws of God,
rather than upon the dictates of sovereigns or of parliaments. They
retained a Puritan willingness to rest their political case�and their
personal fortunes�upon God's law, staking all upon the proposi
tion that God had revealed His law in His creative work. Thus,
they assumed as self-evident, that there is an unchangeable truth,
which, being the expression of nature's God, is applicable in all
circumstances and to all cases.
It is the contention of the advocates of the theistic view of
human rights, that the appeal to Natural Law is valid as jar as it
goes. That is, the appeal to natural law is correct in its assumption
that there is a standard of right and wrong which is antecedent to
positive law, and that God was the source of this standard. What
is questioned is, whether this position can maintain itself without
more explicit reference to an adequate Christian theology. In other
words, it is questioned whether there is not a damaging ambiguity
in the deistic position which rests its case merely upon God's activ-
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ity in creation, by which human rights may be misinterpreted as
being inherent in man, rather than conferred upon him.
The crux of the question at this point is, the extent to which
man is continually reliant upon his Maker. There is a rather vigor
ous tendency in our day to transpose the source of human rights to
a humanistic basis. Some are explicit in writing that Christian prin
ciples had far less influence upon the Men of 1776 than is com
monly supposed, and that in their reference to "nature's God" they
were actually protesting the theistic position with the best weapons
then at hand. This does not affect the real validity of the work of
the framers. It does highlight the position which asserts that an
adequate view of human rights as proceeding from God requires
for its maintenance and nourishment the full position of historic
Christian theism, in which the doctrines of divine sovereignty and
divine providence are given large recognition.
A large source of the tragedy of the twentieth century is the
prevalence of a pragmatic philosophy which seeks to supersede all
positions which rest upon eternal and unchangeable truth. This
positivistic spirit is hostile to the principles of Natural Law, but
finds it easier to cope with a view which rests upon the rather re
mote conception of "nature's God" than with the assertions of a
theism which holds that God upholds all things by the word of His
power, that He is Lord of nations of history, and that the times of
all men are in His hand. Our democracy, based as it is upon natural
law, is a way of hfe which rests upon something more than the
forms of the religious life. It is based, ultimately, upon men and
women whose high views of civic morality and civic responsibility
are the outcroppings of a devout recognition of the active operation
of God in human life. How long it can maintain itself, as a corpo
rate expression of confidence in the rights of man, in the face of the
dwindling of this recognition, one cannot say.
11.
With respect to the question of which rights are proper and
inalienable to man, an article of this length cannot be expected to
do more than to enumerate the rights which are held to be revealed
by Natural Law, to relate them to the principles of the Christian
Faith, and then to examine in a brief fashion the contemporary
tendency to expand the fist of 'rights.'
The Framers of the Declaration of Independence showed a
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remarkable restraint in their enumeration of the rights which were
deemed to be the direct endowment of man from his Creator. These
were indicated to be basically three: life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. Essentially, these are political and civil in character, and
were of such a nature as to imply basically an absence of capricious
and repressive activity upon the part of the State. Life was to be
protected against the destructive whims of rulers and magistrates,
who were after all such only by the consent of the governed. The
right of hberty was 'natural' in that it belonged to the nature of man
as created in the image of God. The right to 'the pursuit of happi
ness' was basically the right to pursue that which was the proper
function of man as from the divine hand�even though the Fall
may have distorted his view, and confused him with respect the
basic questions of ends-and-means.
The power of life and death was exercised by the Roman
pater familias over his offspring; he retained to himself the decision
whether a child should be permitted to survive or not. The Roman
Empire assumed this right over its subjects; and it has been a long
struggle through which the right to life has been wrested from am
bitious and power-mad rulers. In our own time, dictators who spoke
as symbols of omnipotent States, still challenge the right of the
individual to life. Today, the right to life is challenged on a wide
scale and in the grand manner. The Nazi leaders gave a modern
turn to mass murder, in the form of the crime of genocide�the
murder of entire racial groups. It is ironic that the Convention
against genocide is for the moment favored by a nation which
openly professes to be at war-unto-death against entire classes of
men, and has sworn to stop nowhere short of the liquidation of any
and every group which stands in its way. Such cynicism is, of
course, the ultimate in positivism, which denies fixed points in civic
moraUty.
Basically, the right to life is the right to continue living, under
conditions conducive to it, so long as the Lord of life permits. Only
under the most grave circumstances, such as in case of high crime,
may the State be held justified in terminating human life, or in per
mitting any group within society to do so. Sensitive Christians have
seldom been able to consent, in the name of humanity, to legalized
euthanasia, even though death so administered might prevent grave
suffering. When the basic quahty of human life is recognized:
namely that human life on earth is probationary for eternity�then
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none will assume easily the prerogatives belonging to the Lord of
life and death.
The right to liberty is one whose elaboration could occupy
volumes. The most that can be done here is to note its most general
character. A traditional definition is, that liberty is the absence of
compulsive restraint toward a given course of action. Thus, in a
'free' situation, the individual is able to act in either one way or in
another, in the presence of all the elements of proper determination.
It does not, of course, mean the absence of obUgation or of ac
countability. It implies, as an absolute essential, that the individual
is free to work out his destiny. And it is the obhgation of the State
to provide the framework within which that destiny�which reaches
beyond time�may be fulfilled. Such liberty implies freedom of
choice, freedom of conscience, freedom of worship, and freedom
from unnecessary constraint, beyond that which is essential to the
maintenance of a 'society under God.'
It is by no means easy to define the precise manner in which
civil govemment proceeds from God. It is, however, the conviction
of many of us that the democratic form of govemment as it has
been developed in the West under the stimulus of Natural Law
affords the best conditions under which men may exercise liberty in
the fulfillment of their ultimate destinies. We must emphasize here,
that govemments or constitutions do not confer liberty; when and
as they fulfill their duty in this respect, they recognize, protect and
enjoin it, and guard the means to its attainment.
The right to the pursuit of happiness is likewise one whose
exposition involves many by-paths. The very definition of 'happi
ness' has puzzled thinkers for a long time. Augustine found two
hundred eighty-eight such definitions current in his time. Most
sensitive individuals have abandoned at the outset the view that
happiness hes in sensual enjoyment, whether active or passive.
While Aristotle rejected the old equation of happiness with sense-
pleasure, his metaphysical definition, that "Happiness is a bringing
of the soul to act according to the habit of the best and most perfect
virtue," is much too cold. The divorce of philosophy from theology
in the early Modem Period led to a narrowing of the definition of
happiness to mere temporal felicity. In the light of this, it should be
held in mind that happiness here is intimately related to beatitude
in the world to come, since the latter may be anticipated and in
some limited measure be enjoyed here.
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It is most important to note that happiness in this hfe is always
relative and incomplete. All men seek it by nature; in a world of
competing interests and of numerous contingencies, not all find it.
Certainly none are entitled to do so at the expense of the violation
of the rights of others. Positivistic approaches to man's right to
happiness usually conceive of man in material terms, and thus re
strict the 'pursuit of happiness' to his adjustment to environment.
Deeper views of human rights, particularly the theistic view, recog
nize that man is a creature of both body and spirit, and whose des
tination is eternity. It is only in this light that the question of the
pursuit of happiness comes into focus, so that even the problems
which besiege us on all sides begin to make sense. The duty of the
State is to provide the environment in terms of which men will, at
the highest level which they choose, seek for well-being. And it is
the function of the Christian Faith to point them to that highest
level, as it is found in the appropriation of the Grace of our Lord.
Two tendencies appear in the contemporary discussion of
human rights. The first is, to multiply the number, so as to include
among them not only civil and political rights, but economic and
social rights as well. The second is, to consider human rights as con
ferred by a govemment, or by an intemational super-govemment.
With reference to the first of these tendencies, it should be said that
it parallels the tendency of govemments to reach further and further
into the affairs of its citizens, and to offer security as a substitute
for historic freedoms. Guided by doctrinaire notions of property
ownership, the newer 'liberal' movements create a false antithesis
between 'property rights' and 'human rights.'
This is a part of the evil logic of Marxism, which not only
recognizes the irreconcilable opposition between its dogma and the
natural desire to acquire and own property, but which capitalizes
upon the conflicts which its adoption will set up. It is the view of
many, that limited constitutional govemment affords the best pos
sible interplay between human social justice and the 'human right
in property.' Those who would extend the field of human rights so
as to include any and all forms of temporal and economic security
may well find themselves finally enmeshed in the welfare state,
which finds civil and political repression essential to the achieve
ment of what it cynically calls 'economic democracy.'
The second tendency, namely that of considering human rights
as originatmg in govemment, and mamtained by its genial largesse,
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is what one may expect from an international movement which
attempts to include within its membership both free nations and
dictatorships, both communities acknowledging the God of the
Bible and those who acknowledge another god or none at all. There
is good reason to fear that intemational cooperation in the field of
human rights, such as that which has been proposed by the United
Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, must reduce such
theory and practice to the dead level of pragmatic principles of
right and wrong. "Rights" become the donation of the organiza
tion, revocable at its whim. Some will doubtless dismiss such a
statement as the result of "a lack of global thinking." No thinking
person would wish to stand in the way of an improvement of the
conditions which oppress the vast majorities of men and women,
certainly not in the name of a blind and unyielding conservatism.
However, idealisms should not blind Christians in this land to the
point at which they would be willing to surrender our national
heritage to an Organization whose common denominator in the
question at hand is that of a humanistic pragmatism.
If our nation, with its unsought role of leadership in world
affairs, cannot succeed in projecting its fundamental principles into
the councils of the United Nations Organization, it should do some
heart-searching. Should it find itself lacking in moral force to do so,
it should at once seek a return to the source of its former dynamic.
Should it, on the other hand, find itself outvoted by those com
mitted to alien principles, then it should think at least twice before
yielding its basic heritage in retum for some problematic form of a
'brave new world.' Evangelicals may well ponder their responsibility
for stimulating such a self-examination.
